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Introduction 
In 1858 Ralph Waldo Emerson spent 
a month in the Adirondacks at Follensby 
Pond with other intellectuals of the time. 
Later in the nineteenth century and early 
in the twentieth, the philosophers William 
James, John Dewey, and other thinkers vis­
ited Keene Valley many times, hiking and 
camping in the area of Mt. Marcy (Schnei­
der, 1997). Although some of these visi­
tors wrote of the beauty of the region, or 
of the challenges of hiking the High Peaks, 
none produced works arguing for wilder­
ness preservation or defending the intrin­
sic value of nature or the rights of animals. 
The absence of such philosophical 
defense of nonhuman nature in the writ­
ings of thinkers who obviously loved the 
Adirondacks partly illustrates the fact that 
in the past, in their professional works, 
philosophers mostly either took nature for 
granted or attempted to show how it is 
inferior to humans (Des Jard ins, 1997). 
In the last twenty-five years, however, with 
the increasing awareness of environmental 
problems, philosophers have turned their 
attention towards nature in order to help 
discover solutions to those problems. The 
result is the growing field of environmen­
tal ethics, or environmental philosophy, 
which began as a branch of ethics, consid­
ering how ethics might be applied to envi­
ronmental problems, and which has 
emerged as a distinct subdiscipline of phi­
losophy (Ouderkirk, 1998). 
Not surprisingly, many of the themes 
and theories of environmental philosophy 
are relevant to the Adirondack region and 
its environmental problems and concerns. 
I would like to summarize some of those 
theories, explaining how they relate (or do 
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not relate) to the Adirondacks. But in the 
second part of this essay, I will give more 
concentrated attention to the current 
philosophical debate about an environ­
mental question that touches the heart of 
one Adirondack controversy: wilderness. 
An Overview of Environmental 
Philosophy 
Three caveats before beginning: I stress 
that what follows is an abbreviation of 
much complex philosophical speculation. 
Such abbreviation sometimes fosters mis­
understanding. I hope readers will bear 
that in mind and will, when they see the 
need for it, seek additional clarity in the 
works cited. In addition, the scope of my 
overview is limited. There are other views, 
other theorists who provide alternative the­
ories. I only have space to indicate some of 
the diversity in the field. Finally, no one 
should expect that the adoption of any 
particular philosophical theory will solve 
all our environmental problems, in the 
Adirondacks or globall
y. 
To do so is to 
misunderstand the nature and role of phi­
losophy, which is to help us clarify our 
concepts and practices and to develop the­
ories that, functioning as explanatory 
frameworks, can contribute to solutions. 
It is probably too soon to write a histo­
ry of environmental philosophy, but it is 
clear that some of the earliest effons were 
to secure recognition, in moral theory and 
thus in moral discussions, for no.nhumans 
(Des Jardins, 1997). Thus, there was a 
great deal of attention to the question of 
moral standing, that is, which entities (if 
any) besides humans we should respect 
morally. This remains a theme in environ­
mental philosophy, but unfortunately 
many nonphilosophers identify it with the 
animal liberation movement, though, as 
we shall see, the kinds of entities philoso­
phers have proposed for moral standing 
have gone well beyond individual animals. 
Though they are distinct fields with dis­
tinct and sometimes conflicting concerns, 
there is the connection between animal 
liberation and environmental philosophy 
tl1at both defend the moral significance of 
no.nhumans. 
Animal liberation thought divides into 
two strands, Peter Singer's Utilitarianism 
and Tom Regan's Kantian approach. The 
former says that sentience, the capacity to 
feel pleasure and pain, is the ultimate crite­
rion for considering a creature in moral 
deliberation (Singer, 1990). The latter, 
speaking in the language of rights and 
duties, claims that any creature that is the 
"conscious subject of a life" possesses rights 
and we have a duty to respect those rights 
as much as we do humans' rights (Regan, 
1983). Such theories could influence 
thinking about the Adirondacks in several 
ways. The most obvious pertains to hunt­
ing, fishing, and trapping, each of which is 
prominent in Adirondack culture and each 
of which animal liberation thinkers and 
activists condemn. 
Note that it is not a sufficient response 
to either Singer or Regan to say, "We have 
always hunted (or fished or trapped) so 
your theories must be false." All me 
thinkers we'll consider are aware mat meir 
theories indicate the need to reform our 
practices. The challenge is not to defend 
traditions by re-asserting them but to 
examine the opposing arguments to see if 
they are cogent and valid. 
Environmental philosophers have 
done just mat with animal liberation phi­
losophy and have found what they regard 
as fatal weaknesses. One central concern is 
endangered species. That category includes 
plants, but even for endangered animal 
species, animal liberation philosophy 
reserves no special place, focusing exclu­
sively on me welfare of individual animals. 
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